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TRANSSEXUAL LAW UNCONSTITUTIONAL: GERMAN FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT DEMANDS REFORMATION OF LAW 
BECAUSE OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS CONFLICT 
INTRODUCTION 
With the Broadway premiere of Hedwig and the Angry Inch (1998), 
Germany assumed a prominent position in the cultural discussion surrounding 
transsexuals.1  Based on the true story of an East German prostitute working as 
a babysitter in Kansas, Hedwig relates the trials experienced by the victim of a 
botched sex change.2  In a recent decision, Germany’s Federal Constitutional 
Court3 addressed the problems of another sort of botched sex change: this time 
a legal one.  A transsexual had to choose between having his new gender 
recognized under the Transsexual Law4 and remaining married to his spouse of 
over fifty years.  The court held that the country’s Transsexual Law was 
unconstitutional because it required post-operative transsexuals seeking 
recognition of their new gender to choose between two constitutionally 
protected fundamental rights: individual integrity and marriage.5 
Transsexuals have long played a role in gender and sexuality discourses, 
but have proved vexing for legal contexts because the change in gender 
represents a departure from a category that was traditionally immutable under 
the law.6  The court in the present case attempted to find legal means for 
 
 1. See, e.g., Leslie Morris, Berlin Elegies: Absence, Postmemory, and Art After Auschwitz, 
in IMAGE AND REMEMBRANCE: REPRESENTATION AND THE HOLOCAUST 288, 299 (Shelley 
Hornstein & Florence Jacobowitz, eds., 2003). 
 2. RAYMOND KNAPP, THE AMERICAN MUSICAL AND THE PERFORMANCE OF PERSONAL 
IDENTITY 252–53 (2006). 
 3. The Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) is Germany’s highest court 
for cases concerning constitutional questions.  The court is discussed in greater detail in Section 
IV.  Translations are by the author of this Comment unless otherwise indicated. 
 4. Gesetz über die Änderung der Vornamen und die Feststellung der 
Geschlechtszugehörigkeit in besonderen Fällen [Transsexuellengesetz—TSG] (“Law on the 
Changing of First Names and the Establishment of Sex Status in Special Cases”) Sept. 10, 1980, 
BGBl. I at 1654 [hereinafter TSG].  The law is commonly referred to as the “Transsexual Law” 
(Transsexuellengesetz), and this Comment adopts the term accordingly. 
 5. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court], May 27, 2008, 1 
BvL 10/05, § 72, available at http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/ls20080527_1bvl00100 
5.html. 
 6. See, e.g., BTDrucks 8/2947 at 8 (citing to Bundesgerichtshof decision from September 
21, 1971, holding that a transsexual could not have a new gender recognized even after 
undergoing gender reassignment surgery because there was no legal basis for such a change). 
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addressing these changes in a fair and constitutional manner.7  This Comment 
examines the existing law and the two legislative alternatives suggested by the 
court, concluding that the court was right to demand changes to the law, and 
arguing that the legislature should opt for the larger changes in order to address 
multiple issues simultaneously.  This study begins with an overview of 
transsexual history and jurisprudence in Germany.  Next, the Comment 
presents the court decision and rationale.  Third, the study analyzes European 
Union guarantees of individual rights and their interaction with German law.  
Fourth, it details German individual rights guarantees and their relationship to 
the Transsexual Law.  Finally, the note examines the consequences of the 
court’s recommendations for legislative action and makes suggestions for 
prudent reformation of the law. 
I.  HISTORY OF TRANSSEXUALITY AND THE TRANSSEXUAL LAW IN GERMANY 
The Transsexual Law took effect in 1980 in Germany following a decision 
by the Federal Constitutional Court.8  The passing of the law was a significant 
moment in transsexual rights in Germany that can best be understood as part of 
a larger cultural and legal history.  This section reviews the cultural history of 
transsexuality in Germany, the development of transsexuality as a legal 
concept in Germany, the 1978 court decision and subsequent enactment of the 
Transsexual Law, and the further definition and codification of transsexual 
rights through later German court decisions. 
A. Definition and History of Transsexualism in Germany 
Transsexuality falls under the transgender “umbrella” in contemporary 
academic discourse.9  The term transgender includes a number of loosely 
related phenomena describing individuals who do not readily fit into the 
traditional binary gender categories.10  In addition to transsexuals, more 
common examples are intersexuals, transvestites, “gay drag, butch lesbianism, 
and such non-European identities as the Native American berdache11 or the 
 
 7. BVerfGE 10/05, §72. 
 8. Volkmar Sigusch, Medizinischer Kommentar zum Transsexuellengesetz, NEUE 
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT, 2740, 2741–42 (1980). 
 9. Paisley Currah, Gender Pluralisms Under the Transgender Umbrella, in TRANSGENDER 
RIGHTS 3, 4 (Paisley Currah et al. eds., 2006) (discussing the term transgender as an “umbrella” 
term for gender dysmorphia and explores the history of the transgender umbrella concept 
stemming from a 1994 Susan Stryker essay). 
 10. Id. at 3–4. 
 11. The berdache is the Navajo concept of “two-spiritedness,” reflecting both genders in one 
person.  See, e.g., Richard M. Juang, Transgendering the Politics of Recognition, in 
TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 242, 259 (Paisley Currah et al. eds., 2006). 
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Indian Hijra.”12  As suggested by the variety of forms the term encompasses, 
transgenderism is part of a continuum of gender, rather than a particular new 
class of gender.13 
Biological sex and, more recently, the social construct of gender typically 
have defined the binary male/female classification system.14  Transgender 
advocates support a more open understanding of sex and gender to reflect the 
multiplicity15 of sex and gender constellations.16  The law has yet to adopt such 
broad changes, but is increasingly willing to view the social consequences of 
medical conditions17 as a basis for granting rights and changing laws.18  
Definitions of “transsexual” vary by jurisdiction, but a typical understanding of 
such codification of transsexuality in the United States can be found in a 
Minnesota state anti-discrimination statute, which considers transsexuals as 
“having or being perceived as having a self-image or identity not traditionally 
associated with one’s biological maleness or femaleness.”19 
Transsexuality can be defined in a number of ways, as noted above, but for 
German law the concept20 must first be differentiated from other phenomena, 
including homosexuality, transvestitism, and intersexuality.21  Under German 
 
 12. Currah, supra note 9, at 4 (quoting Susan Stryker, My Words to Victor Frankenstein 
Above the Village of Chamounix: Performing Gender, GLQ 1:3 (1994)).  The Hijra is an Indian 
concept describing people perceived as eunuchs who do not fit into traditional gender categories.  
See, e.g., Juang, supra note 11, at 259. 
 13. Currah, supra note 9, at 4; see also Dylan Vade, Expanding Gender and Expanding the 
Law: Toward a Social and Legal Conceptualization of Gender that is More Inclusive of 
Transgender People, 11 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 253, 273–278 (2005) (discussing transsexuality 
as part of a “gender galaxy”). 
 14. Vade, supra note 13, at 261–62. 
 15. One list of transgender identities includes: “trans, tranny, trannyboy, trannygirl, 
transsexual, transgender, shinjuku boy, boi, grrl, boy-girl, girl-boy-girl, papi, third gender, fourth 
gender, no gender, bi-spirit, butch, dyke-fag, fairy, elf girl, glitterboy, transman, transwoman—
just to name a few.”  Id. at 266. 
 16. Id. at 264. 
 17. Paisley Currah & Shannon Minter, Unprincipled Exclusions: The Struggle to Achieve 
Judicial and Legislative Equality for Transgender People, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & LAW 37, 
53–54 (2000). 
 18. Julie A. Greenberg & Marybeth Herald, You Can’t Take it with You: Constitutional 
Consequences of Interstate Gender-Identity Rulings, 80 WASH. L.R. 819, 835–39 (2005). 
 19. MINN. STAT. ANN. §363A.03(44) (West 2008) (This statute was renumbered from 
§363.01); see also Currah & Minter, supra note 17, at 48–50 (discussing how different 
jurisdictions incorporate gender identity and transgender into anti-discrimination and hate crime 
legislation). 
 20. Even the simple act of speaking of a “concept” in the singular is problematic in the 
context of transsexuals and the law.  See Claudia Lohrenscheit & Anne Thiemann, Sexuelle 
Selbstbestimmungsrechte—Zur Entwicklung menschenrechtlicher Normen für Lesben, Schwule, 
Transsexuelle und Intersexuelle, in SEXUELLE SELBSTBESTIMMUNG ALS MENSCHENRECHT 15, 
30–32 (Claudia Lohrenscheit ed., 2009). 
 21. Sigusch, supra note 8, at 2743. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1000 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:997 
law, homosexuality occurs when a person is attracted to others of the same 
sex.22  Transvestitism, on the other hand, occurs when an “extended and 
extensive” clothing or undergarment fetish exists.23  Distinguishing between 
these phenomena and transsexuality does not typically present a problem under 
German law.24  The law has greater difficulty separating transsexuality from 
other psychological conditions, however.25  Transsexuality must be 
distinguished from psychological conditions that may give rise to temporary or 
otherwise borderline cases where a person expresses the desire to live as a 
member of the other sex.26  In addition, transsexuals differ from intersexuals in 
that the former experience a strong desire to live in the sex of which they are 
not members, while intersexuals do not wish to change their sexual identity.27  
Many intersexuals consciously wish to remain androgynous or to resist 
aligning with traditional gender concepts.28  Under German law, transsexuals 
differ from others in that they experience from early on a compulsion to live as 
a member of the gender to which he or she was not assigned at birth.29 
Although scientific analyses of transsexuality are a relatively recent 
phenomenon, the understanding of the condition has developed greatly since 
German sexologist Magnus Hirschfeld30 first explained it in early twentieth-
century Berlin.31  As a result of Hirschfeld’s work, Germany was “at the 
forefront of human sex change experiments” in the 1920s.32  Following the 
groundbreaking research by Hirschfeld and his colleagues on transsexuality in 
medicine, other German scientists and politicians have applied biological, 
sexual, and gender criteria to address the various aspects of transsexuality in 
 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. ANJA SCHAMMLER, TRANSSEXUALITÄT UND STRAFVOLLZUG: DIE STÖRUNG DER 
GESCHLECHTLICHEN IDENTITÄT VON STRAFGEFANGENEN ALS STRAFVOLLZUGSRECHTLICHES 
PROBLEM 21 (2008). 
 25. Id. at 21–22. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 19. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Sigusch, supra note 8, at 2742. 
 30. Hirschfeld (1868–1935) founded the “Journal of Sexual Science” (ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
SEXUALWISSENSCHAFT) in 1913 and the closely related Institute for Sexual Science in Berlin in 
1919 to research transsexuality.  Friedemann Pfäfflin, Sex Reassignment, Harry Benjamin, and 
some European Roots, INT. J. TRANSGENDERISM 1, 2 (1997), available at: http://www.iiav.nl/ 
ezines/web/IJT/97-03/numbers/symposion/ijtc0202.htm. 
 31. See, e.g., STEFAN HIRSCHAUER, DIE SOZIALE KONSTRUKTION DER TRANSSEXUALITÄT: 
ÜBER DIE MEDIZIN UND DEN GESCHLECHTSWECHSEL (1993). 
 32. Joanne Meyerowitz, Sex Change and the Popular Press: Historical Notes on 
Transsexuality in the United States, 1930–1955, 4:2 GLQ: A JOURNAL OF GAY AND LESBIAN 
STUDIES 159, 162 (1998). 
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different contexts.33  Such specialized, context-specific definitions, however, 
do not generally suffice across the board: “Transgender people represent for 
law a challenge of the notion of sex as naturally immutable, and therefore 
serve to problematise [sic] the basis of gendered and heterosexual 
subjectivities.”34 
The Federal Republic of Germany (“West Germany”) defined its current 
views on transsexuality as a legal concept in the “Transsexual Law” of 1980.  
German lawmakers35 recognized the difficulty in fitting transsexuals into 
traditional gender categories in creating the Transsexual Law, noting that the 
existing expectation of “immutability of gender” was no longer “tenable.”36  
That law refers to “[p]ersons who feel they belong to another sex than that of 
their female or male bodily make-up.”37  This definition reflects physical, 
social, and psychological dimensions in recognizing the phenomenon.38  The 
legal recognition of the changes, however, is based entirely on medical 
procedures and the resulting physical changes.39  A transsexual cannot petition 
for recognition of a new gender unless he or she has experienced the desire to 
live as a member of the other sex for at least three years.40  The application for 
recognition of a new name or a new gender requires expert testimony in a 
procedure that normally takes at least six months.41  In contrast to neighboring 
Austria, which strictly limits medical treatment to a specific group of doctors at 
the University of Vienna, Germany is relatively open in accepting opinions 
from any qualified medical expert.42  The Transsexual Law details treatment of 
transsexuals in civil matters.43  Criminal matters affecting transsexuals have 
 
 33. ANDREW N. SHARPE, TRANSGENDER JURISPRUDENCE: DYSPHORIC BODIES OF LAW 4 
(2002). 
 34. Id. 
 35. The Transsexual Law is a federal law in Germany, unlike in the United States, where 
each state creates its own provisions subject to federal constitutional limits.  Greenberg & Herald, 
supra note 18, at 823–24. 
 36. BTDrucks, supra note 6, at 8. 
 37. Friedemann Pfäfflin, Psychiatric and Legal Implications of the New Law for 
Transsexuals in the Federal Republic of Germany, 4 INT’L. J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 191, 192 (1981). 
 38. See id. at 198. 
 39. Id. at 194–95. 
 40. TSG §§ 1(1), 8(1). 
 41. C. Weitze, M.D. & S. Osburg, M.D., Empirical Data on Epidemiology and Application 
of the German Transsexuals’ Act During Its First Ten Years, 2 INT. J. OF TRANSGENDERISM 1 
(1998), available at http://www.iiav.nl/ezines/web/IJT/97-03/numbers/symposion/ijtc0303.htm. 
 42. Bundesministerium für Justiz, Mitteilung vom 20. Dezember 1996 über den Erlaβ des 
Bundesministeriums für Inneres betreffend personenstandsrechtliche Stellung Transsexueller, 
AMTSBLATT DER ÖSTERREICHISCHEN JUSTIZVERWALTUNG (March 20, 1997), reprinted in 
TRANSSEXUALISM IN EUROPE 32 (2000). 
 43. See generally TSG. 
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been resolved on a case-by-case basis with reference to both the Transsexual 
Law and the German Penal Code (“Strafvollzugsgesetz”).44 
This definition encoded in the Transsexual Law is not the only legal 
perspective German law has recognized, and historical context can provide 
insight on the current case.  German scholars began addressing the 
phenomenon of transsexuality on a large scale around 1910, and the first 
“genital-retrofitting operations” took place in Berlin and Prague in 1912.45  
The earliest work on transsexualism viewed the phenomenon as primarily a 
physical condition manifesting itself in psychological terms.46  More recently, 
the academic and legal communities have sought to address the social concerns 
arising out of the medical/psychological condition, rather than treating some 
unidentifiable physiological cause.47  Experts in Germany do not attempt to 
“cure” transsexuality, instead viewing gender-reassignment surgeries48 as the 
means for addressing both the medical condition experienced by the 
transsexual and any related social issues.49  Experts rely primarily on the 
presence of a number of symptoms in making their assessments and must 
differentiate transsexuality from conditions such as homosexuality and 
transvestitism in addressing patient and court requirements.50 
Transsexuality in Germany today is viewed with an eye towards national 
history and the persecution of transsexuals during the Nazi era, a time that—
not surprisingly—can only be viewed as disastrous for transsexual rights.51  
The “Law for the Prevention of Genetically-Sick Offspring” was passed in 
1933 and implemented with extreme efficiency following the Nuremberg Laws 
of 1935.52  Under the law, hundreds of thousands were sterilized because they 
 
 44. SCHAMMLER, supra note 24, at 65–196. 
 45. Sigusch, supra note 8, at 2740. 
 46. Id. at 2741. 
 47. Although there have been significant refinements in the process, the scientific response 
to transsexuality and the desire to have a sex change operation varies widely and is fraught with 
difficulties even today.  See, e.g., Dean Spade, Resisting Medicine, Re/Modeling Gender, 18 
BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 15, 23-37 (2003). 
 48. A number of different procedures exist which fall under the category of sex-change 
(gender-reassignment) surgeries.  See Michael Sohn & Gereon Schäfer, Transidentität aus der 
Sicht der plastisch-rekonstruktiven Genitalchirurgie, in TRANSSEXUALITÄT UND 
INTERSEXUALITÄT: MEDIZINISCHE, ETHISCHE, SOZIALE UND JURISTISCHE ASPEKTE 131, 131–48 
(Dominik Groß, Christiane Neuschuafer-Rube, & Jan Steinmetzer, eds., 2008). 
 49. Cathrin Correll, Im falschen Körper: Ein Beitrag zur rechtlichen und tatsächlichen 
Problematik der Transsexualität, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 3372, 3373 (1999). 
 50. Sigusch, supra note 8, at 2742–43. 
 51. Friedemann Pfäfflin, supra note 30. 
 52. STEFAN MAIWALD & GERD MISCHLER, SEXUALITÄT UNTER DEM HAKENKREUZ: 
MANIPULATION UND VERNICHTUNG DER INTIMSPHÄRE IM NS-STAAT 64 (1999).  In German, the 
law is called the “Gesetz zur Verhütung erbkranken Nachwuchses.” 
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were deemed “unworthy of reproduction.”53  The groups singled out for 
sterilization included gypsies, Jews, invalid veterans from World War I, 
homosexuals, and transsexuals.54  Nazi scientists working for SS-director 
Heinrich Himmler even performed gruesome experiments designed to increase 
their efficiency in sterilizing individuals.55  In addition to sterilization, 
concentration camp researchers had a great interest in restoring sexual drives to 
a “normal” heterosexual state and selected inmates for other studies, including 
“hormonal repolarization.”56  In “repolarization” an artificial gland was 
surgically implanted into the groin to change the patient’s sexual drive, 
allegedly resulting in stronger and “better looking” inmates.57  As part of a 
larger program, “repolarization” aimed to increase the nation’s reproductive 
capacity by manipulating the patients’ sex drive.58  Such programs are now 
widely condemned by officials: the persecution of homosexuals and other 
individuals “living differently” is now commemorated and condemned by a 
national monument in the German capital, Berlin,59 and a memorial square in 
Vienna, the capital of Austria.60 
With these social, medical, and cultural concerns in mind, the Federal 
Republic of Germany attempted to address the social problems experienced by 
transsexuals through the Transsexual Law in 1980.61  Since the introduction of 
the Transsexual Law, Germany has seen increasing numbers of applications to 
have new genders recognized.62  Estimates of the current transsexual 
population in Germany range from around 8000 to 83,000.63  At the time the 
law was enacted, the government estimated there were 7000 to 8000 
 
 53. Id. at 67.  The German speaks of “Fortpflanzungsunwürdigkeit.” 
 54. Id. at 66–67. 
 55. Id. at 72–73. 
 56. GÜNTER GRAU, HOMOSEXUALITÄT IN DER NS-ZEIT 345 (1993). 
 57. Id. at 352–53.  According to research reports, other inmates commented to the doctors on 
the improvement in appearance of patients who had undergone such treatment.  Id. 
 58. Id. at 346. 
 59. Kulturminister Bernd Neumann übergibt Denkmal für die im Nationalsozialismus 
verfolgten Homosexuellen, PRESSE- UND INFORMATIONSAMT DER BUNDESREGIURUNG 
PRESSEMITTEILUNG NR. 188, May 27, 2008, http://www.bundesregierung.de. 
 60. Mahnmal für homosexuelle und transgender Opfer des Nationalsozialismus auf dem 
Morzinplatz—Hans Kupelweiser: Der rosa Platz, 2008, http://www.publicartvienna.at/picts/ 
Morzin_pressemappe_d_neu.pdf.  See also Artistic Design:  Memorial Commemorating the 
Homosexual and Transgender Victims of the Nazi Regime at Morizplatz 2 (2008) 
http://www.publicartvienna.at/picts/Morzin_pressemappe_e_neu.pdf. 
 61. BTDrucks 8/2947 at 1. 
 62. Weitze & Osburg, supra note 41. 
 63. SCHAMMLER, supra note 24, at 13–14.  Estimates in respectable newspapers are as high 
as 400,000, but academic studies suggests the number is likely much lower than that.  Jan 
Steinmetzer & Dominik Groß, Transsexualität in den Printmedien:  Eine Analyse überregionaler 
deutschsprachgier Tageszeitungen, in TRANSSEXUALITÄT UND INTERSEXULITÄT:  
MEDIZINISCHE, ETHISCHE, SOZIALE UND JURISTISCHE ASPEKTE, supra note 48, at 31, 34–35. 
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transsexuals living in West Germany.64  This would correspond to 9000 to 
12,000 individuals in contemporary unified Germany.65  Courts in the Federal 
Republic of Germany had 1422 gender-recognition cases under the 
Transsexual Law between 1981 and 199066 representing 1199 persons.67  The 
male-to-female cases of gender recognition predominated by a ratio of 2.3:1.68  
The average age of applicants was thirty-three, which may have been 
artificially high,69 because the Transsexual Law initially required applicants to 
be twenty-five-years old70 before their new gender could be recognized.71  
Interestingly, some courts simply ignored the age requirement even before the 
Federal Constitutional Court struck it down.72  On the other hand, there were 
only six cases of “retransformation,” reversion to the original legal gender, 
during this period.73 
B. German Court Cases Granting and Expanding Transsexual Rights 
The Transsexual Law resulted from a Federal Constitutional Court 
decision in 1978.74  The Constitutional Court reviewed a petition for 
 
 64. Plenarprotokoll (Plenary Protocol) Deutscher Bundestag 8/230 18683, 18687 (July 4, 
1980). 
 65. This figure is an extrapolation from the government’s earlier estimate.  The Federal 
Statistical Office does not maintain statistics on the number of transsexuals in Germany nor on 
the number of gender-reassignment applications.  E-mail from Meike Kaspari, Statistician, 
German Federal Statistical Office [Statistisches Bundesamt], to author (Nov. 14, 2008, 04:18 
CST) (on file with author).  An inquiry with the Ministry for Health [Bundesministerium für 
Gesundheit] has gone unanswered. 
 66. No studies addressing the subsequent period exist, and the government does not keep 
statistics.  Id. 
 67. Weitze & Osburg, supra note 41. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Transsexuals generally know early in life that they do not identify with the gender 
assigned to them.  In many cases, however, individuals do not or cannot change their status until 
later dates.  See Loree Cook-Daniels, Trans Aging, in LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND 
TRANSGENDER AGING: RESEARCH AND CLINICAL PERSPECTIVES 20, 22–23 (Douglas Kimmel, 
Tara Rose, & Steven David, eds., 2006). 
 70. The law required applicants for the “Minor Solution” to be twenty-five-years old, but the 
Federal Constitutional Court held that the age requirement does not apply to the “Major Solution” 
because the medical operation required would in effect place the decisions in the hands of treating 
doctors, rather than with the patient.  Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 
[Federal Constitutional Court] 1 BvR 938/81.  See also I. GG Art I, 2 I, 3 I; TranssexuellenG §§ 1 
I Nr. 3, 8 I Nr. 1 (Keine starre Altersgrenze für Personenstandsänderung eines Transsexuellen), 
in NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 2061, 2061 (1982). 
 71. Weitze & Osburg, supra note 41. 
 72. Id.  The court decision striking down the age requirement receives more attention in Part 
B of the Section. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional 
Court] Oct. 11, 1978, docket no. 1 BvR 16/72, at juris online/Rechtsprechung. 
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recognition of a new gender brought by a man who had undergone hormone 
therapy and surgery and sought to be recognized as a woman.75  The petitioner 
sought to have the new gender recognized to alleviate employment-related 
problems in his (her) work as a nurse.76  The decision rested primarily on 
constitutional grounds under the right to individuality in Article 1.77  The court 
held that recognition of a sex change operation would not conflict with social 
mores as long as it was “medically indicated.”78  Since the enactment of the 
law, a number of court cases have led to expansion of transsexual rights on 
constitutional grounds.  For example, the Federal Constitutional Court 
concluded that the law must apply without discrimination to both heterosexual 
and homosexual transsexuals.79  The court also eliminated the requirement that 
petitioners for gender recognition be at least twenty-five-years old as 
unjustified unequal treatment of citizens under Article 3 of the Basic Law.80  
Transsexuality is recognized as a medical condition, and as a result, 
transsexuals now receive medical coverage for operations and related 
treatment.81  In addition, the court has expanded the application of the law to 
non-German nationals with a specified extended residency status in 
Germany.82 
C. Legislative Intent in Response to Constitutional Court Decisions 
The Transsexual Law was designed to address the “social hardships” that 
transsexuals in Germany had endured as a result of their gender.83  Legislators 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. I. GG Art. I, 2 I; PStG §§ 30, 46, 46a, 47 I (Änderung des Geschlechtseintrags im 
Geburtenbuch bei Transsexuellen), in NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT, supra note 70, at 
595, 595. 
 78. Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional 
Court] Oct. 11, 1978, docket no. 1 BvR 16/72. 
 79. Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional 
Court] Dec. 6, 2005, 1 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVL] 3/03, available at jurisonline/ 
Rechtsprechung (holding that a homosexual transsexual who had had his name changed to a 
female first name was allowed to retain the name under the “minor solution” of the Transsexual 
Law after entering into a marriage with a woman). 
 80. Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional 
Court] Mar. 16, 1982, docket no. 1 BvR 938/81 at jurisonline/Rechtsprechung. 
 81. Landessozialgericht [LSG Stuttgart] Nov. 27 1981, docket no. L 4 Kr 483/80. 
 82. Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional 
Court] July 18, 2006, 1 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVL] 1/04 (holding in separate, combined 
cases that a Thai man and an Ethiopian woman could have their new gender recognized in 
Germany when their home countries would not allow such recognition).  See Transsexuelle 
erhalten mehr Rechte, SÜDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, Nov. 8, 2006, at 7, available at 2006 WLNR 
19336709. 
 83. Friedemann Pfäfflin, supra note 37, at 191. 
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sought to achieve “lasting harmony of soul and body and conflict-free 
integration in society” by allowing legal recognition of the new gender, 
departing from the traditional “immutability” of sex.84  Legislators had to 
address the issue in light of the Federal Constitutional Court’s decision; but 
they also wanted to avoid making it “too easy” for transsexuals by removing 
“too many obstacles.”85  The Bundestag and Bundesrat had differing views on 
the law, which eventually took on the contours envisioned by the Bundesrat.86  
The Bundestag argued that the marriage of a transsexual seeking recognition of 
a new gender would not need to be dissolved in advance, in order to avoid 
unnecessary costs.87  Because the process of gender recognition would require 
a significant amount of time and might not be successful, it was thought to be 
risky to allow a married person to enter into the proceedings for gender 
recognition, and require a divorce in advance, without knowing the result of 
the gender status decision.88  The Bundesrat, on the other hand, concentrated 
on the effect of the divorce on the other partner in the marriage.89  A divorce in 
advance would allow the marriage partner to avoid the proceedings involved in 
the recognition of the former spouse’s new gender.90  This prior separation was 
believed both to spare the spouse and allow the transsexual partner to resolve 
his “highly personal” matter unencumbered.91  This Bundesrat provision 
requiring a petitioner to be single became encoded in the “Major Solution” of 
the Transsexual Law, to be discussed in greater detail below.92 
D. Structure of the Law 
The Transsexual Law includes two options for transsexuals seeking to 
have a new legal gender officially recognized.  The “Minor Solution” involves 
changing the petitioner’s name without altering the person’s legal gender.93  
The “Major Solution” provision encompasses both a name change and legal 
recognition of the new gender.94  This section discusses the two solutions in 
turn and compares the requirements and ramifications of both. 
 
 84. BTDrucks 8/2947 at 8. 
 85. Pfäfflin, supra note 37, at 196. 
 86. BVerfGE 10/05, § 13 (quoting Deutscher Bundestag, 8 Wp., Plenarprotokoll v. 4. Juli 
1980, 230. Sitzung, S. 18683, 18687 f.). 
 87. Id. § 11 (quoting BTDrucks 8/2947 at 6). 
 88. Id. (quoting BTDrucks 8/2947 at 6). 
 89. Id. § 12 (quoting BTDrucks 8/2947 at 21). 
 90. Id. 
 91. BVerfGE 10/05, § 12. 
 92. See infra at Part I.D.2. 
 93. TSG §1. 
 94. Id. §8. 
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1. “Minor Solution” 
Paragraph 1 of the Transsexual Law defines the “Minor Solution,” which 
allows a person to take a new name in recognition of the individual’s act of 
living as a person of the opposite gender.95  This provision changes the name, 
but does not allow the new gender to be recognized in a legal sense.96  A 
prerequisite for this option is living for three years under the new gender.97  
The court must also determine that the individual will not change his/her 
feeling of belonging to the respective other gender.98  Finally, the individual 
must be a German citizen or resident under the Basic Law and meet certain 
enumerated conditions listed in clause (3) of the paragraph.99  The new gender 
(name) is recognized only by way of a court decision, which requires opinions 
from two medical experts.100  An individual can move to have the name change 
reversed.101  The name change can also be reversed involuntarily in certain 
circumstances, such as if the individual has a child more than three hundred 
days after the name change becomes official, or if the individual marries 
again.102  The minor solution becomes automatically invalid if the petitioner 
enters into a marriage following the recognition of the new name.103 
2. “Major Solution” 
The “Major Solution” allows an individual who has undergone gender-
reassignment surgery to have his or her new gender recognized legally.104  This 
option includes all of the requirements of the “Minor Solution,” including the 
three-year period of living in the new gender.105  The “Major Solution” also 
adds three additional provisions.  First, the individual may not be married.106  
Second, the individual must be “permanently incapable of reproducing.”107  
Finally, the individual must have had surgery to achieve all of the outward 
 
 95. Id. § 1(1). 
 96. Id. §1. 
 97. Id. 
 98. TSG §1(2). 
 99. Id. §1(3). 
 100. Id. § 4(3). 
 101. Id. § 6. 
 102. Id. § 7. 
 103. TSG § 7(1)(3).  The Federal Constitutional Court has ruled this provision 
unconstitutional in a separate decision, but it is unclear how the law will respond.  See Peter A. 
Windel, Transidentität und Recht—ein Überblick, in TRANSSEXUALITÄT UND 
INTERSEXUALITÄT: MEDIZINISCHE, ETHISCHE, SOZIALE UND JURISTISCHE ASPEKTE, supra note 
48, at 67, 77. 
 104. TSG § 8. 
 105. Id. § 8(1)(1). 
 106. Id. § 8(1)(2). 
 107. Id. § 8(1)(3). 
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characteristics of the new gender.108  Unlike with the “Minor Solution,” there 
is no provision for retracting the decision recognizing the individual’s new 
gender, because gender reassignment surgery109 is irreversible.110  Because 
marriage is not allowed, there is no provision to invalidate the new gender 
recognition in the “Major Solution” of the Transsexual Law.111 
II.  OVERVIEW OF THE CASE 
This section details the facts of the case and the court’s rationale.  The 
section concludes with an overview of the court’s suggestions for remedying 
the constitutional defect in the current version of the Transsexual Law. 
A. Facts 
In May 2008, Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court declared the 
country’s Transsexual Law112 unconstitutional.113  The petitioner114 was born 
in 1929, and after fifty-six years of marriage (including three children), he 
decided to undergo a gender reassignment surgery in order to live as a 
woman.115  The petitioner stated unequivocally that he “had been a woman in a 
man’s body since birth.”116  In accordance with relevant German law requiring 
the use of a gender-appropriate name in order to have the new gender 
recognized,117 the petitioner had been using a female first name since 2001.118  
After receiving the requisite course of hormone therapy, the petitioner’s gender 
reassignment surgery took place in 2002.119 
 
 108. Id. § 8(1)(4). 
 109. This note follows organizations such as the Transgender Law Center in using the term 
“gender reassignment surgery” to reflect the goal of changing the gender category to which a 
person belongs, thus addressing the social construct of gender.  See, e.g., Medi-Cal and Gender 
Reassignment Procedures, TRANSGENDER LAW CENTER (May 2002), http://transgenderlaw 
center.org/pdf.MediCal%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf. 
 110. Sigusch, supra note 8, at 2745. 
 111. See Windel, supra note 103, at 76. 
 112. Gesetz über die Änderung der Vornamen und die Feststellung der 
Geschlechtszugehörigkeit in besonderen Fällen (Transsexuellengesetz), (September 10, 1980), 
BGBl.I at 1654. 
 113. Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional 
Court] May 27, 2008, 1 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVL] 10/05. 
 114. “Petitioner” refers to the person seeking recognition of a new gender in this discussion, 
rather than the petitioner to the Federal Constitutional Court, which was the Berlin district of 
Schöneberg.  See infra note 128–30 and accompanying text. 
 115. BVerfGE 10/05, § 15. 
 116. Id. § 16. 
 117. TSG § 1. 
 118. BVerfGE 10/05, § 15. 
 119. Id. 
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Following surgery, the petitioner sought to be recognized as a woman 
under the “Major Solution” provision of the Transsexual Law.120  Under the 
Transsexual Law, Germany recognizes the new gender only if the individual is 
not married.121  The married couple here wished to remain married, citing their 
long history and the petitioner’s psychological limitations, which resulted from 
his abuse while living as a transsexual during the Nazi era.122  The petitioner 
argued that fear and panic attacks would prevent the petitioner from living 
apart from his wife123 for three years, as required under German divorce law.124  
Financial limitations also allegedly prevented the couple from divorcing, 
because they could afford neither to pay for the proceedings nor to maintain 
two separate households, as required under German law.125  Finally, German 
divorce law requires that a marriage be “damaged,” and here the couple did not 
agree that this condition could be met, viewing a divorce as an “overwhelming 
insult” in light of their over fifty-year common history.126  The petitioner was 
seventy-two-years old at the beginning of the proceedings in 2002 and seventy-
nine at their resolution in 2008.127 
The desire to remain married set up a conflict between the petitioner’s 
constitutionally guaranteed right to a self-determined gender identity and the 
special protection guaranteed to marriage under a different constitutional 
provision.  The petitioner requested recognition of his new gender under the 
Transsexual Law at the local administrative office.128  In response to the 
petitioner’s request to remain married, the administrative office of Schöneberg, 
a municipal district of the city of Berlin,129 sought review of the case by the 
Federal Constitutional Court in August 2005.130  The court’s decision came 
down on May 27, 2008131 and received wide media attention.132  But the legal 
 
 120. Id. 
 121. TSG § 8(1)(2). 
 122. BVerfGE 10/05, § 16. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB][Civil Code] § 1566(2). 
 125. BVerfGE 10/05, § 16. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Sigrid Averesch, Ehe von Transsexuellen bleibt bestehen: Kein Scheidungszwang nach 
Geschlechtsumwandlung, BERLINER ZEITUNG, July 24, 2008, at 6, available at 2008 WLNR 
13752369. 
 128. BVerfGE 10/05, § 15. 
 129. Berlin is a so-called “Stadt-Staat,” a city that is simultaneously a state.  WULF KOEPKE, 
DIE DEUTSCHEN 179 (4th ed. 1993).  This action arose in the district administrative office in 
Schöneberg, which was acting on behalf of the state of Berlin (“Land Berlin”).  BVerfGE 10/05 
at Leitsatz.  The “Landgericht” of the district in which the petitioner lives has jurisdiction over 
TSG decisions.  TSG § 2. 
 130. BVerfGE 10/05 at Leitsatz. 
 131. Id. 
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community has not yet discussed the matter in detail, nor has the German 
parliament decided how to resolve the constitutional dispute.133 
B. The Court’s Rationale 
The court found the Transsexual Law unconstitutional, because the law 
forced individuals to choose between protected fundamental rights.134  The 
constitution guarantees135 that marriage is protected as a basic right,136 but the 
constitution also guarantees individual integrity as a protected fundamental 
right.137  The court found the law constitutional except for its marriage 
provision and declared unconstitutional only TSG § 8(1)(2), the subparagraph 
requiring that a person be unmarried in order to have his/her new gender 
recognized.138  In reaching the decision, the court considered the law itself, the 
German Basic Law, and several amicus briefs.139  The decision examined 
whether the law was justified and proportional.140  For purposes of the 
Constitutional Court’s analysis, a law is proportional if it is suitable, 
appropriate, and necessary.141  The court’s analysis of these aspects will be 
discussed in turn. 
German courts view a law as “justified” if it is “borne by a legitimate 
goal.”142  The court explained that legislators must recognize the “essential 
structural principles” of marriage, which despite societal change includes only 
the union of a man and a woman based on free will under the aegis of the 
state.143  The court agreed with the Ministry of the Interior’s amicus brief144 on 
the definition of marriage, concluding that because the Basic Law operates 
under this understanding of marriage, the court must interpret the law 
 
 132. See, e.g., Averesch, supra note 127, at 6; Stefan Geiger, Gericht stärkt Rechte von 
Transsexuellen: Karlsruhe erklärt den bisherigen Zwang zur Ehescheidung für 
verfassungswidrig, STUTTGARTER ZEITUNG, July 24, 2008, at 18, available at 2008 WL 
13750352; Es gilt die Ehe, SÜDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, July 24, 2008 at 6, available at 2008 WLNR 
13741552; Gift transsexuell får kallas kvinna, SVENSKA DAGBLADET, July 24, 2008, available at 
http://www.svd.se/nyheter/utrikes/artikel_1485515.svd. 
 133. The Bundesrat has not reformed the Transsexual Law, but has officially decided not to 
take action on the matter.  BTDrucks 579/09. 
 134. BVerfGE 10/05, § 36. 
 135. See infra Part IV (for a discussion of constitutional rights guarantees). 
 136. Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [GG] [Federal Constitution] May 23, 
1949. Art. 6, ¶ 1. 
 137. GG Art. 2, ¶ 1. 
 138. BVerfGE 10/05, § 36. 
 139. Id. § 22. 
 140. Id. §§ 40, 46. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. § 42. 
 143. BVerfGE 10/05, § 45. 
 144. Id. § 23. 
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accordingly.145  The law must balance the “special protection” of marriage and 
“self-determined gender identity” provided by the Basic Law with the legal 
construction of marriage provided by German law and societal norms.146  In 
the contemporary legal context and under current law, the court concluded that 
it is a legitimate legislative goal to prevent the combination of two persons of 
the same gender in marriage under the Transsexual Law.147  The court closed 
its initial discussion of justification with the cautionary note that even if the 
Transsexual Law is justified, it must also be proportional “in its 
formulation.”148 
The court’s opinion does not discuss proportionality explicitly, but 
concludes that the Transsexual Law is proportional in a broad sense.149  The 
court discussed proportionality of the law in both its broad and narrow sense in 
determining whether the law was suitable, appropriate, and necessary.150  The 
court found the Transsexual Law was suitable to prevent marriages that give 
the impression that two people of the same gender are married.151  The court 
also found that the Transsexual Law was appropriate to meet the goal of 
limiting marriage to a man and a woman.152  In its discussion of 
appropriateness, the court also addressed the “Minor Solution” of the 
Transsexual Law, which allows for a person to live as a member of the new 
gender with a suitable name without legal recognition of the new gender 
itself.153  The court recognized that the situation arising out of the “Minor 
Solution” provisions of the Transsexual Law gives “the false impression” that 
same-sex pairs can enter into marriage.154  Nevertheless, the court concluded 
that the marriage dissolution requirement is appropriate for achieving the 
legitimate legislative goal of preventing marriage between same-sex 
partners.155  The court’s analysis then turned from appropriateness to necessity, 
a requirement the court also deemed satisfied.156 
After examining the goals of the law, the court turned to its effects.  Here 
the court found that TSG § 8(2) is “disproportional in a narrower sense.”157  
The court also rejected an alternative form of the law that the original 
 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. BVerfGE 10/05, § 42. 
 149. Id. § 49. 
 150. Id. § 46. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. § 46. 
 153. BVerfGE 10/05, § 47. 
 154. Id. § 46. 
 155. Id. § 47. 
 156. Id. § 46. 
 157. Id. § 49. 
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legislation considered to be sufficiently mild toward the petitioner to justify 
accepting that version of the law.158  This earlier alternative was to dissolve the 
marriage automatically following the recognition of the new gender.159  The 
court deemed that solution no better because it, too, failed to address the 
deprivation of fundamental rights.160  As the court explained, individuals who 
enter into marriage through “legally directed” means “enjoy the protection of 
Art. 6 (1) of the Basic Law without limitation.”161  The court concluded that it 
would be too much to ask to force a transsexual to give up his spouse, with 
whom he is “bound” and “wishes to remain together,” without allowing him 
the opportunity to continue the relationship in another, equally secure form.162 
At the very least, marriage dissolution would mean that the former spouses 
would have to live apart in order to comply with the law that requires a three-
year separation before a divorce is complete.163  This requirement serves to 
establish that the marriage has truly “failed.”164  In the case of transsexuals, 
however, the end of the marriage has nothing to do with the failure of the 
marriage, but rather with the avoidance of same-sex marriages.165  
Additionally, agreeing with the Federation of Lesbians and Gays,166 the court 
emphasized that the Transsexual Law’s requirement that the petitioner be 
unmarried affects not only the transsexual petitioner, but also the spouse.167 
A forced divorce would deprive the existing marriage of its 
constitutionally provided protection.168  Because marriage falls under the 
protection of Article 6 of the Basic Law, the right to the protection of the 
marriage is “unlimited.”169  The court reasoned that when the spouses do not 
agree to forgo the protection of their marriage, the state cannot force them to 
do so, because such a requirement would violate fundamental rights.170 
C. Court Suggestions for Resolving the Conflict 
In its decision, the court outlined two strategies the German parliament 
could implement to meet constitutional requirements.  First, the government 
 
 158. BVerfGE 10/05, § 49. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. § 58. 
 162. Id. § 49. 
 163. BGB § 1566. 
 164. BVerfGE 10/05, §54. 
 165. Id. § 55. 
 166. Id. § 29. In the original German this organization is the “Lesben- und 
Schwulenverband.” 
 167. Id. § 56. 
 168. Id. § 57. 
 169. BVerfGE 10/05, § 58. 
 170. Id. § 59. 
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could allow the transsexual’s marriage to continue in the same legal form—
that is, parliament could drop the unmarried requirement from the transsexual 
law.171  The court deemed this option feasible because of “the minimal 
number” of people in similar situations.172  Alternatively, the government 
could allow the transsexual couple to continue the relationship in a life 
partnership, provided that the new partnership retain all the rights the marriage 
had offered.173  Until the legislators decide which path to pursue, the law will 
not apply, and the couple in this case will remain married.174  Effectively, a de 
facto same-sex marriage exists on an interim basis, because the petitioner is 
now living as a woman.175  The court gave the government a grace period until 
August 1, 2009 to enact a new law addressing the subject.176  Neither new 
legislation nor discussion in official parliament sessions has taken place as of 
January 13, 2010, and it is unclear when the legislature will address the law. 
III.  THE INTERACTION OF GERMAN AND EUROPEAN UNION LAW 
The Transsexual Law is a German federal law applicable exclusively 
within Germany.  Nevertheless, in addition to German law and the German 
constitution, the European Union Constitution and European Convention on 
Human Rights determine some limits of the law’s application and ensure that 
certain minimum criteria are met.  This section provides an overview of 
national laws from several European countries to place Germany’s law in 
context.  The analysis then shifts to the interaction of EU law with German law 
to demonstrate that Germany’s law must acknowledge certain individual rights 
in order to avoid running afoul of European constitutional principles. 
A. Survey of European Transsexual Laws 
A number of strategies for addressing the legal gender of transsexuals 
exist.177  Germany allows for legal gender changes and recognizes the new 
 
 171. Id. § 72. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. § 68. 
 174. BVerfGE 10/05, § 74. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. § 73. 
 177. An overview of the six main possibilities places the German solution in context and 
illustrates some of the alternatives that the German legislature could have considered when 
creating the Transsexual Law in 1980.  First, the government could forbid sex change operations 
and declare them punishable as grievous bodily harm.  Friedemann Pfäfflin, supra note 37, at 
192.  This option does not allow for recognition of the new gender.  Id.  Second, sex reassignment 
surgery can be forbidden, which also precludes the recognition of the new gender.  Id.  Third, sex 
change operations can be permitted without recognizing the new gender.  Id.  Fourth, sex change 
operations may be permitted and the new gender may be recognized.  Id.  The legal recognition of 
the new gender may vary by individual case or by local jurisdiction.  Id.  Fifth, uniform legal 
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gender fully under current law.178  This option is a more generous grant of 
legal rights and certainty than in most countries.179  In Europe, the trend has 
been toward increasing recognition of the post-operative gender of 
transsexuals.180  Sweden enacted the first law allowing for legal recognition of 
a new gender in 1972, followed by varying degrees of recognition in Germany 
(1981), Italy (1982), the Netherlands (1985), and Turkey (1988).181  
Recognition procedures vary greatly, from the systematic methods of Germany 
and Austria to the lax case-by-case administration in countries like the former 
Yugoslavia (now the independent nations Serbia and Montenegro).182  At least 
thirty-three European countries now recognize reassignment of gender, and at 
least twenty-two countries permit transsexuals to marry.183  But recognition of 
a marriage legal in one country may not apply in other EU countries or outside 
the EU.184  Many countries have enacted new laws in the area in recent years, 
revising and broadening provisions on transsexuals to reflect societal trends.185  
German legislators actively reviewed existing European law and other foreign 
legislation when drafting the Transsexual Law in 1980.186  However, the law 
 
provisions allow for the sex change operation and recognition of the new gender.  Id.  Finally, a 
country may not officially acknowledge that transsexualism exists, thus making no mention of the 
issue in its law.  Id. 
 178. See TSG § 8. 
 179. See Friedemann Pfäfflin, supra note 37, at 192 (noting the numerous harsher 
alternatives). 
 180. Frédérique Granet, Consolidated Report on Transsexualism in Europe, in 
TRANSSEXUALISM IN EUROPE, supra note 42, at 9, 17. 
 181. Weitze & Osburg, supra note 41. 
 182. See generally Marija Draskic, Yugoslavia: The Medico-Legal Issue of Transsexuality, 31 
CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 115, 121–25 (2000) (describing Yugoslavian law pertaining to transsexuals).  
See also Svetlana Vujovic et al., Transsexualism in Serbia: A Twenty-Year Follow-Up Study, 6 J. 
SEXUAL MED. 1018, 1019 (2008). 
 183. Helen G. Berrigan, Transsexual Marriage: A Trans-Atlantic Judicial Dialogue, 12 LAW 
& SEXUALITY: REV. LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL & TRANSGENDER LEGAL ISSUES 87, 109 (2003).  
See generally, European TransGender Network, “Country Survey: Civil Status” and “Country 
Survey: Right of Name” (2005), available at http://tgeu.net under “Documents” (surveying the 
requirements for right of name and civil status in various European countries). 
 184. See generally Barbara E. Graham-Siegenthaler, Principles of Marriage Recognition 
Applied to Same-Sex Marriage Recognition in Switzerland and Europe, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 
121 (1998) (comparing the marriage laws of various European countries using Switzerland as a 
reference point). 
 185. Germany is an example that certainly applies here, as this note illustrates.  See also 
María Elena Lauroba Lacasa, El derecho de familia en España, hoy: del matrimonio indissoluble 
al matrimonio entre personas del mismo sexo, 75 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 935, 1001–05 (2006) 
(detailing key Spanish legislation that has broadened its provisions regarding transsexuals in 
accordance to cultural trends throughout Europe). 
 186. BTDrucks 8/2947 at 9–11. 
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has not been revised in a major way since then, even as laws across Europe 
have changed.187 
B. EU Law and Its Interaction with German Law 
EU law places limits on German federal law by way of human rights 
guarantees.  States acceding to EU membership, including Germany, agreed to 
the fundamental guarantees of personal liberty included in the EU 
constitution.188  The EU constitution provides that neither segregation nor 
limitation of “individual liberty” may exist in member countries.189  Germany’s 
Federal Constitutional Court has also recognized that the protection of basic 
rights has assumed a fundamental position no longer subject to review under 
national standards.190  The European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950 (“Convention”), which can be 
viewed as an “accessory constitution,” established the minimum standards for 
basic rights.191  In the EU, the Convention guarantees as fundamental the rights 
to family life and individual integrity.192  Article 8 of the Convention states 
that “everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life,” and that 
“[t]here shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this 
right.”193  Article 12 declares, “[M]en and women . . . have the right to marry 
and found a family, according to national laws governing the exercise of this 
right.”194  The restriction included in Article 12—“according to national 
laws”—proves critical in this context.  National law governs marriage and 
family law; but human rights can be expanded on the basis of European 
constitutional guarantees.195  When Germany enacted the Transsexual Law in 
 
 187. See generally TSG. 
 188. Armin von Bogdandy, Constitutional Principles for Europe, in RECENT TRENDS IN 
GERMAN AND EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: GERMAN REPORTS PRESENTED TO THE 
XVIITH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS ON COMPARATIVE LAW, UTRECHT, 16 TO 22 JULY 2006, at 
1, 9 (Eibe Riedel & Rüdiger Wolfrum eds., 2006). 
 189. Id. at 8–9. 
 190. See Ralph Alexander Lorz, Emergence of European Constitutional Law, in RECENT 
TRENDS IN GERMAN AND EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: GERMAN REPORTS PRESENTED TO 
THE XVIIITH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS ON COMPARATIVE LAW, UTRECHT, 16 TO 22 JULY 
2006, at 37, 50 (Eibe Riedel & Rüdiger Wolfrum eds., 2006). 
 191. Id. at 56 (explaining that an “accessory constitution . . . is and remains a treaty under 
public international law but a special one:  because it is able to have a direct impact on the 
constitutional orders of its member states”). 
 192. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950), in 
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 30, 33 (1975). 
 193. Id.  There are some exceptions to this right, such as protection of health or morals.  Id. 
 194. Id. at 34. 
 195. Lorz, supra note 190, at 56. 
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1980, for example, legislators referred to a 1979 European Commission on 
Human Rights.196 
EU efforts to draft laws on transsexual rights provide one avenue for 
addressing the legal status of transsexuals.197  For example, the International 
Commission on Civil Status198 attempted to create European law in 1999 with 
the “Convention of the International Commission on Civil Status on the 
Recognition of Sex Reassignment Decisions and Explanatory Report Adopted 
by the Lisbon General Assembly on 16 September 1999.”199  The Commission 
expressed the desire to “foster the recognition on their territory of decisions 
recording a person’s sex reassignment, taken in another contracting state.”200  
The Commission explicitly left the laws regarding civil status and 
consequences of the recognition of a new gender to the member states and only 
sought to expand recognition among member states of the new status granted 
in the home country.201  The recognition provisions take effect in member 
states only upon ratification by member states.202  Germany has not yet ratified 
the convention.203  Such limited efforts at achieving a modicum of recognition 
across borders have done little to expand fundamental rights for transsexuals, 
even where they were ratified.204 
European court decisions have proven more effective in forcing expansions 
of rights in many member states under national rights laws in a transition from 
sex-based to gender-based legal classifications.205  The 1970 United Kingdom 
case Corbett v. Corbett illustrates the older paradigm against which later cases 
reacted.206  In Corbett, a married male-to-female transsexual sought divorce 
 
 196. BTDrucks 8/4120 at 13. 
 197. See generally Convention (N˚ 29) of the International Commission on Civil Status 
(ICCS) on the Recognition of Sex Reassignment Decisions and Explanatory Report Adopted by 
the Lisbon General Assembly on 16 September 1999, in TRANSSEXUALISM IN EUROPE, supra 
note 42, at 67 [hereinafter Convention] (exemplifying this sort of drafting effort). 
 198. “The ICCS is an intergovernmental organization comprising the following states: 
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from her husband, who knew she was a transsexual and nevertheless had 
married her.207  The English court held that the marriage was void because the 
wife had been born as a male and sex was determined at birth.208  The court 
explained that the wife was a male because she had male chromosomal cells 
and that her outward appearance was a mere “pastiche of femininity.”209  The 
court found that biological sex is fixed at birth and cannot be changed.210  
Corbett dominated the legal discourse211 on transsexuality until 2002,212 when 
the I v. United Kindgom court “dismissed Corbett from the dialogue.”213  The I 
court held that transsexuals had the right to have their new gender recognized 
under Art. 8 and the right to marry under Art. 12 of the Convention.214  The 
court cited “major social changes” in its holding, brought about by increased 
acceptance of gender identity disorders in the medical and scientific 
community.215  The court felt that society should “tolerate a certain 
inconvenience to enable individuals to live in dignity and worth in accordance 
with the sexual identity chosen by them at great personal cost.”216 
Although their early grants were limited in scope, European courts long 
ago began extending rights to transsexuals, deciding as early as 1976 that 
transsexuals could rely on Directive 76/207 for its protections against gender 
discrimination in the employment context.217  Such positive protection of rights 
did not necessarily translate into broad interpretations of secondary law, 
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however.218  England, for example, was reluctant to extend health benefits to 
persons seeking gender reassignment surgery.219  This view was rejected in 
Van Kück, though, when the European Court of Human Rights held that health 
insurance providers were required to pay for gender reassignment surgery as a 
treatment for a medical condition.220  The court justified this conclusion on the 
basis of individual integrity rights under Art. 8 of the Convention.221 
In Van Kück, individual integrity was defined as the basic essential of self-
determination,222 and the court noted that the constitution created a positive 
duty to actively enforce this right.223  The court found that the right to “sexual 
self-determination” was one aspect of the petitioner’s right to respect for her 
private life.224  The court also found that a presumption existed that persons 
were justified in undergoing sex-change operations because they related to 
“one of the most intimate areas of private life . . . .”225 
Recent European case law tends to be more receptive to transsexuals than 
to homosexuals in the marriage context, to the extent that national family law 
now explicitly addresses transsexuals.226  The traditional image of marriage as 
between one man and one woman dominated European jurisprudence on 
marriage rights until at least 2000.227  Since then, the European Court of 
Human Rights has found that denying transsexuals the right to marry a person 
of their former, pre-operative gender would violate the right to marry.228  
Decisions granting broader rights to transsexuals than homosexuals could 
reflect the difficulty implicit in addressing a legal change in a context not 
adapted to such categorical changes, but it is more likely that this position 
arises from financial concerns.229  An internal EU consulting document 
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estimated that if it provided equal benefits to same-sex partners, the staffing 
costs for its employees alone would increase to € 1,537,000 for 
accommodation allowances with a general total of € 4,491,000 on an annual 
basis.230  The equal treatment of transsexuals, in contrast, would have “limited 
financial implications.”231 
IV.  GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES AND THE TRANSSEXUAL LAW 
In addition to the rise of the EU constitution, events in both German and 
world history have led to several major breaks in the constitutional 
development of today’s Federal Republic of Germany.  The end of World War 
II led to the formulation of the Basic Law (“Grundgesetz”), unified Germany’s 
current constitution, which was enacted in 1949 as a provisional document in 
anticipation of the unification of the separated German states.232  The East 
German Constitution was adopted in 1949 as well, and the two documents 
governed concurrently until the two German states united in 1990.233  The 
constitutions set very different priorities, and a brief overview of them is 
necessary to explain the Basic Law and the constitutional principles in effect 
today.  This section begins by examining the West German Basic Law, then 
moves to the East German Constitution, before concluding with a discussion of 
the constitution (“Basic Law”) in contemporary united Germany. 
A. German Constitutional Priorities in the Post-War Era 
Following World War II, Germany had to reconfigure its legal system as 
part of the de-Nazification of the country.234  This was complicated by the fact 
that the Western powers occupying the Federal Republic of Germany were 
pursuing different priorities than the Soviet-dominated German Democratic 
Republic, a fact reflected in the differing constitutions of these two 
countries.235  Specifically, in the area of human rights and individual liberties, 
West Germany offered broader protection of individual integrity.236  Because 
the two German states unified after the passing of the Transsexual Law in West 
Germany in 1980, a brief overview of the differences between the constitutions 
and the principles adopted following unification is necessary to gain a precise 
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understanding of exactly what constitutional guarantees played a role here.237  
This section reviews the constitutional guarantees of rights in both West and 
East Germany, and follows by analyzing the constitutional law issues resulting 
from the synthesis of those two states. 
The state that later came to be known as West Germany adopted the “Basic 
Law,” its equivalent to a constitution, on May 23, 1949.238  The Basic Law 
drew heavily on experiences under National Socialist rule.239  In addition to 
many other atrocities, the Nazis had introduced legislation to criminalize and 
force the sterilization of certain groups, including transsexuals, who were 
deemed to be “damaging to the people.”240  This oppressive history led to the 
inclusion of strongly worded guarantees of fundamental rights in the new Basic 
Law, to be discussed in greater detail below.241  Conservative predecessor laws 
on marriage and the subordinate role of women in Germany’s Civil Code may 
also have led in part to the strong sense of equality in the new Basic Law.242 
Unlike in the West, “[d]uring the making of the first East German 
Constitution of 1949, the past seemed absent.”243  Communist East Germany 
viewed itself as a victim of Nazi atrocities and was more interested in 
transforming the future than addressing past wrongs.244  Nevertheless, the 
Constitution of 1949 guaranteed basic rights and even included a provision to 
protect the substance of the basic rights from apparent restriction by any law, 
including the constitution itself.245  As this protection of protections suggests, 
the Constitution of 1949 was more concerned with theoretical rights than 
actual application and protection of individual liberties.246  The Constitution of 
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1949 also guaranteed basic rights of gender equality for males and females247 
and the protection of marriage.248 
Following German reunification in 1990, the Basic Law was amended and 
adopted for use throughout the territory of the enlarged Federal Republic of 
Germany.249  Although some laws from East Germany took effect in united 
Germany, East Germany did not have legislation addressing recognition of 
new gender in transsexuals.250  This meant that the Transsexual Law and all 
related human rights provisions in the Basic Law were adopted throughout 
what was formerly East Germany.251  Consequently, subsequent constitutional 
interpretations of the Transsexual Law need not refer to East German 
provisions on transsexual rights. 
B. Guarantees of Individual Civil Rights in Germany 
Under the German constitution, certain rights are non-derogable and 
cannot be changed by the legislature under any circumstances.252  The 
constitution enumerates these rights in Article 79(3), which states that any 
restrictions on Articles 1-20 are “disallowed.”253  Articles 2 and 3, which 
provide for the protection of individual integrity and gender equality, are 
included in the protected provisions.254  Article 6, covering the protection of 
family and marriage rights, is also considered a non-derogable right.255  The 
rights to marriage and individual integrity came into conflict in the present 
case and this note discusses them in turn. 
German family law expressed in the Basic Law and its understanding of 
marriage developed from Germanic tribal law positions on marital status.256  
These earlier views tended to create a form of concubinate, which, perhaps 
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unsurprisingly, developed primarily on the basis of property laws.257  Modern 
law added religious characteristics to the mix, recognizing the role of 
Christianity in German society.258  Marriage under church auspices was 
legitimate only if deemed acceptable by the church.259  The civil marriage 
developed in response to this phenomenon as a marriage under control of the 
State beginning in 1875.260  The German Basic Law developed its protection of 
marriage in this historical context.261 
Germany has struggled in finding adequate solutions to the conflict 
between constitutional protections of marriage and efforts to prevent 
discrimination against same-sex couples in creating a partnership that does not 
disturb the special role of marriage.262  The Federal Constitutional Court now 
reads the State’s duty to protect marriage differently to allow the two 
partnership forms to coexist under the Constitution.263  The court had long 
operated under the belief that it had a “‘duty to privilege marriage in 
comparison to other legal institutions.’”264  Now the court adopts the view that 
“‘the constitution allows positive discrimination in favour [sic] of marriage but 
does not oblige the legislator to do so.’”265  The German federal government 
eliminated most discriminatory provisions from the Lebenspartnergesetz (“Life 
Partner Law”) in 2004, although it maintained separate terminology for some 
phenomena to differentiate between marriage and same-sex partnerships.266  
Some minor differences remain in other areas as well, such as maintenance 
rights.267  Now that the prohibition on common adoption by same-sex partners 
has been eliminated,268 the primary exceptions to equal rights are pension 
rights and major tax differences.269 
Gender integrity is guaranteed under Articles 2 and 3 of the Basic Law, 
which provide for gender equality and recognition of the right of self-
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determination of the individual.270  German courts were indifferent to these 
provisions with regard to sexual discrimination until the early 1990s, but have 
since taken a more proactive role in enforcing equal treatment on the basis of 
gender.271  German courts have enforced gender equality based on biological 
differences rigorously under Article 3(3) of the Basic Law since the 1970s.272  
The courts view such differential treatment as discriminatory.273  These 
principles are anchored in the area of transsexual rights by European court 
decisions,274 as well, which have refined the German constitutional definition 
of individual integrity regarding transsexual rights.275 
C. Conflict Resolution and Court Rationalization for Differentiating 
Marriage and Unions 
When rendering decisions on fundamental rights, the Federal 
Constitutional Court weighs the interests of the affected individual against the 
interests of society.276  Germany follows the legal principle recognizing both 
lex generalis and lex specificis, meaning that analysis of a particular event 
must consider both the specific provisions of a narrow statute and the broader 
concepts of general laws and the Constitution.277  German Constitutional Court 
decisions rely on an underlying “value system” for interpreting individual 
provisions of the law.278  The Court can weigh the values of the respective 
rights at stake against each other in proceedings on constitutional norms, but it 
cannot restrict the rights in any way.279  The Court may declare a law 
unconstitutional in whole or in part.280  Alternatively, the Court can require the 
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legislature to amend the law following Court guidance.281  The latter option 
purports to maintain the separation of government by leaving the final choice 
on statutory development with the legislative branch.282  The deciding principle 
is ultimately always reducible to a fundamental right protected by the Basic 
Law, as governed by Article 19.283  The present case involved a so-called 
“review in concreto,”284 which is a proceeding considering the compatibility of 
a state law with federal law.285  Such proceedings arise under Article 100 of the 
Basic Law.286 
German law forbids discrimination among different members of like-
situated groups.287  But current readings of the Basic Law permit the so-called 
“furthering principle” for protected groups.288  In other words, the government 
may give preferential treatment to a particular group, but it may not treat a 
group worse than others.289  This policy appears to be pure discrimination on 
its face, but the Federal Constitutional Court views this differently and 
explained its position with respect to marriage in a 1980 case.290  In that case, 
the court held that the state has “a positive obligation to . . . support marriage,” 
and that it is prohibited from “harming or otherwise impairing” marriage as an 
institution.291  The court allows different treatment of civil unions and marriage 
under its positive duty of support.292  Here, however, the court decision 
allowing the petitioner’s marriage to continue reflects the minimum rights 
requirements of the German Basic Law and European law guaranteeing 
individual integrity and the protection of marriage.293 
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V.  COURT RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION TO RESOLVE THE 
CONFLICT 
The Federal Constitutional Court set the Transsexual Law aside as a result 
of the constitutional conflict it forced on the petitioner.294  The court offered 
legislators two means for solving the constitutional problem in the law, 
allowing until August 1, 2009 to meet the requirement.295  This section reviews 
the two options separately, explains the consequences of each possibility, and 
concludes by making recommendations on legislative action. 
A. The “Minor” Resolution 
The court suggested the legislature could solve the constitutional conflict 
by simply striking the marriage requirement from the Transsexual Law.296  If 
both partners entered into a legal marriage, they could remain married 
following recognition of the new gender even if the marriage would give the 
impression that two members of the same sex were married.297  This option 
would allow same-sex marriages to exist in the small number of cases where 
the married couple wished to remain together.298  This solution, which requires 
fewer changes to existing law, is the logical and consistent extension of the 
Article 6 protection of marriage.299 
B. The “Major” Resolution 
Alternatively the court suggested that the legislature could allow the 
marriage to continue in the form of a civil partnership with all of the rights 
associated with marriage.300  This option would require changing the 
Transsexual Law in a minor way to reflect the new partnership form.301  More 
importantly, this strategy would require reconfiguring the laws on civil 
partnerships available to same-sex partners.302  A same-sex partnership as 
suggested by the court with all of the rights of marriage would differ from 
marriage only in a semantic sense.303  Because the court does not specify what 
such a partnership would need to include, legislators would need to decide to 
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whom the law would apply, i.e., whether to create a new form of partnership to 
apply only to transsexuals or to expand civil partnerships to everyone to meet 
the court’s requirements. 
C. Consequences of Each Option 
The legislature was required to enact a new version of the Transsexual 
Law by August 1, 2009.304  The two options presented by the court differ 
greatly in their effect on both transsexuals and others.  An exhaustive list of all 
of the differences associated with the two alternatives to the current law would 
go well beyond the scope of this article;305 but selected important areas of law 
provide a useful framework for discussing the advantages and shortcomings of 
the two solutions.  This section focuses on tax and pensions; inheritance; and 
health care provisions in German law, with limited mention of other significant 
effects arising from the Transsexual Law. 
1. Tax and Pensions 
Under the policy of supporting marriage, the court permits different 
treatment of married couples and civil partnerships for tax purposes.306  
Income tax treatment of couples differs most significantly with regard to 
income splitting,307 which is allowed only for married couples in Germany.308  
Income splitting is optional at the taxpayer’s discretion, but not available in the 
full form to unmarried couples.309  Under current readings of Art. 6 of the 
Basic Law, the government is obligated to “positively” protect marriage.310  
This would not preclude extending splitting to unmarried and same-sex 
couples, but the introduction of income splitting for same-sex couples in 
Germany has proved problematic because it would require extending the 
benefits to unmarried couples under Article 6.311  Although the government is 
required by the Basic Law to protect marriage, legislation does not need to 
protect all life partnerships, even if there is clear tax discrimination.312  In the 
case of income splitting, the court has concluded that this tax inequality is not a 
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form of tax favoring, because it merely reflects the “average marriage” by 
including in splitting the amount of income which two individuals would be 
able to deduct from income as a standard nontaxable basis income.313  
Presently, the nontaxable basis income is € 52,152 per person pear year, or € 
104,304 per married couple per year.314  This nontaxable income clearly favors 
married couples where the individual taxpayers have differing amounts of 
income.315 
The Transsexual Law does not address tax treatment of transsexuals 
explicitly, but it does consider the right of a transsexual to receive pension 
benefits following recognition of a new gender.316  Transsexuals who have had 
their new gender recognized do not have the right to receive “pension plans 
and other similar regularly recurring payments” stemming from the 
relationship with the former spouse.317  For tax purposes, a double penalty 
results: transsexuals receive neither a pension from their former spouses, nor 
the tax benefit318 of splitting for separated spouses and those spouses who lead 
separate households long-term.319 
2. Inheritance 
Germany is one of many European countries to differentiate between 
heterosexual and homosexual partnerships in inheritance matters.320  German 
law distinguishes between categories of heirs in determining tax liabilities on 
inheritances.321  The taxation categories are assigned to relatives and non-
relative heirs on the basis of relationship proximity, with a clear preference for 
inheritance within a family.322  Under the Transsexual Law, the parent-child 
relationship remains intact, including for inheritance tax purposes.323  But the 
surviving partner of a married couple receives significant tax benefits 
compared to the surviving partner of a life partnership or an unmarried 
couple.324  For a surviving spouse, the tax begins at 7% of the inheritance for 
 
 313. TIPKE & LANG, supra note 288, at 407. 
 314. Id. at 133–34. 
 315. Seer, supra note 312, at 374. 
 316. TSG § 12(2). 
 317. Id. 
 318. EStG § 10 I Nr. 1. 
 319. TIPKE & LANG, supra note 288, at 368. 
 320. NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL 
FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW 119 (2008). 
 321. Erbschaftsteuergesetz [ErbStG] [Inheritance Tax Law], Feb. 27, 1997, BGBl I at 378, § 
19. 
 322. TIPKE & LANG, supra note 288, at 173–74. 
 323. TSG § 11. 
 324. TIPKE & LANG, supra note 288, at 524. 
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up to € 52,000 and peaks at 30% for sums over € 25,565,000.325  For same sex 
partners and many unmarried partners, the tax begins at 17% for sums up to € 
52,000 and peaks at 50% for sums over € 2,565,000.326  Unmarried partners 
may also fall in between these two in certain circumstances.327  Despite 
awareness of different taxation for different life partnerships,328 legislation in 
December 2007 that updated329 the inheritance tax did not address the 
classification of same-sex and unmarried partners for tax purposes.330 
3. Healthcare 
The Transsexual Law provision requiring unmarried status has little, if 
any, direct effect on health care among the partners to a marriage or civil 
union.331  Under the 2001 German Life Partner Law, partners of a civil union, 
popularly known as “homo-marriage,” have a duty of care identical to that of 
heterosexual marriages.332  This duty may extend beyond the duration of the 
civil partnership if the parties dissolve the partnership.333  Partners have the 
right to share household insurance, visit each other in the hospital, and act as 
next-of-kin in medical decisions.334  In the case of divorce, the Life Partner 
Law applies the same provisions of the Civil Code Book335 to civil 
partnerships as to dissolved marriages, including the right to financial support 
from the former partner.336  Because the duty of care and support for 
homosexual partnerships are the same as for traditional heterosexual 
 
 325. ErbStG § 19, I. 
 326. Id. 
 327. TIPKE & LANG, supra note 288, at 524. 
 328. Id. 
 329. The effects of these changes in the tax laws are still unresolved in some respects at the 
administrative level, but same-sex and unmarried partners are not affected by unresolved 
questions.  See, e.g., Harald Plewka, Die Entwicklung des Steuerrechts, NEUE JURISTISCHE 
WOCHENSCHRIFT 3410, 3414–15 (2009) (describing recent inheritance tax reform without 
mentioning changes affecting same-sex partnerships). 
 330. ErbStG § 15(1). 
 331. For an overview of potentially affected issues, see Emilia Lombardi and Talia Bettcher, 
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender/Transsexual Individuals, in SOCIAL INJUSTICE AND 
PUBLIC HEALTH 130, 134 (Barry S. Levy & Victor W. Sidel eds., 2006). 
 332. Gesetz über die Eingetragene Lebenspartnerschaft [LPartG] [Life Partner Law], Feb. 16, 
2001, BGBl. I at 266, last amended by Gesetz, Dec. 21, 2007, BGBl. I at 3189, § 2, available at 
juris online/Bundesrecht. 
 333. Id. § 16. 
 334. Jes Kraus, Monkey See, Monkey Do: On Baker, Goodridge, and the Need for 
Consistency in Same-Sex Alternatives to Marriage, 26 VT. L. REV. 959, 982 (2002). 
 335. The Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch is the primary collection of laws relating to private civil 
matters, such as identification cards.  See OTTO PALANDT, BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH (Peter 
Bassenge et al. eds., 2008). 
 336. LPartG §§ 16, 20. 
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marriages, health provisions would remain unaffected by the two solutions 
offered. 
4. Other Issues 
Other issues come into play in laws addressing transsexuals, many of them 
extending far beyond the limited scope of the Transsexual Law.337  For 
example, either army or civil service is required of German males.338  This 
service duty does not extend to females.339  Transsexuals are excused from this 
compulsory service as well, including female-to-male transsexuals, who in 
theory would be required to serve in their new gender.340  For military service 
purposes, marriage and civil partnerships also figure into the equation, because 
individuals who are married or living in a civil partnership are excused from 
military service.341  Criminal law plays a role, as well, including the housing 
and work assignments of transsexual prisoners.342  In addition, prisoners have 
the right to receive visitors, but this right may be limited by local prison 
rules.343  Visits by nonrelatives may be restricted with greater ease than visits 
by relatives, including spouses.344  Visits may be conditioned on constant 
supervision.345  The new Transsexual Law needs to address these issues.346  
Concerns also arise in employment law, family law, and health care law 
relating to sex-specific treatments, and in other contexts.347 
In addition, and perhaps more importantly, the court’s recommendations 
do not go far enough to right other wrongs in the Transsexual Law itself.  
Although the court’s suggested laws do acknowledge the gender recognition 
 
 337. SCHAMMLER, supra note 24, at 41–43. 
 338. Wehrpflichtgesetz [WPG] [Military Service Law], Sept. 16, 2008, BGBl. I at 1886, § 1, 
available at juris online/Rechtsprechung. 
 339. Id. 
 340. SCHAMMLER, supra note 24, at 43 n.168. 
 341. WPG § 10(1). 
 342. SCHAMMLER, supra note 24, at 65–175.  One noteworthy example is the so-called “Pink 
Giant,” a man currently undergoing hormone therapy in preparation for gender reassignment 
surgery—with the hope of subsequent release.  The “Pink Giant” is a 6’, 6” former police officer 
who, among other things, murdered five women and a baby between October 1989 and April 
1991.  The former “Wolfgang” now goes by “Beate” in the prison where he has been living and 
interacting regularly with other inmates since 1992.  Der sechsfache Mörder von Beelitz erhält 
eine Hormonbehandlung, um eine Frau zu werden, MÄRKISCHE ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, August 
6, 2009, http://www.maerkischeallgemeine.de/cms/beitrag/11575978/62249/Der-sechsfache-
Moerder-von-Beelitz-erhaelt-eine-Hormonbehandlung.html. 
 343. Gesetz über den Vollzug der Freiheitsstrafe und der freiheitsentziehenden Maßregeln der 
Besserung und Sicherung (Strafvollzugsgesetz) [StVollzG] [Penal Law], March 16, 1976, 
BGBl. I at 581, § 24. 
 344. StVollzG § 25. 
 345. Id. § 27. 
 346. SCHAMMLER, supra note 24, at 195–96. 
 347. Id. at 43. 
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issues implicit in transsexual operations, they do not address the underlying 
eugenics question that remains under the law’s non-fertility provision.348  As 
described above, the National Socialist regime sought to eliminate transsexuals 
and other groups it deemed undesirable by sterilizing them.349  The petitioner 
in the present case suffered at the hands of the Nazis because of his 
transsexuality.350  Following in that ignoble tradition, the Federal Republic also 
demands that individuals seeking recognition of their new gender be 
permanently infertile.351  Although transsexuals are generally infertile, it is not 
always the case.352 
Why the government has retained the infertility requirement is not readily 
apparent,353 particularly in light of recent government efforts to condemn354 
past eugenics efforts aimed at eliminating homosexuals and other “sexual 
deviant persons” under the “hereditary health law.”355  In addition to such 
social policy concerns, the infertility requirement likely also conflicts with 
Article 2 of the Basic Law,356 which protects the right to physical integrity of a 
person’s body.357  It is unclear how the government can reconcile granting 
rights to medical treatment to transsexuals on the basis of their right to 
individual integrity358 while simultaneously denying transsexuals the right to 
reproduce and invading their bodily integrity by requiring their infertility.359  
Finally, recent changes in law on adoption and civil partnerships for 
homosexuals have rendered the original purpose of the infertility provisions 
redundant.360  The legislature intended to prevent transsexual couples from 
 
 348. TSG § 8(1)(3). 
 349. See, e.g., Friedemann Pfäfflin, The Connections Between Eugenics, Sterilization and 
Mass Murder in Germany from 1933 to 1945, 5 MEDICINE & LAW 1, 2–4 (1986). 
 350.  BVerfGE, decision of May 27, 2008, docket number 1 BvL 10/05, § 16, available at 
juris online/Rechtsprechung. 
 351. TSG § 8(1)(3). 
 352. Stephen Whittle, Gemeinschaftsfremden—or How to Be Shafted by Your Friends: 
Sterilization Requirements and Legal Status Recognition for the Transsexual, in LEGAL 
QUEERIES: LESBIAN, GAY AND TRANSGENDER LEGAL STUDIES 42, 43–44 (Leslie J. Moran, 
Daniel Monk & Sarah Beresford eds., 1998). 
 353. Grünberger, supra note 297, at 106. 
 354. See, e.g., Press Release, Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregiurung 
Pressemitteilung Nr. 188, Kulturstaatsminister Bernd Neumann übergibt Denkmal für die im 
Nationalsozialismus verfolgten Homosexuellen (May 27, 2008), available at 
http://www.bundesregierung.de/nn_774/Content/DE/Archiv16/Pressemitteilungen/BPA/2008/05/
2008-05-27-bkm-mahnmal-hohenschoenhausen.html. 
 355. Pfäfflin, Sex Reassignment, supra note 30. 
 356. Grünberger, supra note 297, at 103. 
 357. Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [GG] [Constitution] art. 2, ¶ 2 
(F.R.G.). 
 358. See Van Kück v. Germany, 2003-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 22–25. 
 359. TSG § 8 (1)(3). 
 360. Deutscher Bundestag Innenausschuss Protokoll 16/31 at 36. 
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giving the impression that same-sex couples were in a union with children.361  
Such situations are now possible, eliminating the professed justification for the 
infertility requirement on that ground, as well.362  In the present case, the court 
did not reach the infertility provision, because the petitioner only addressed the 
marriage requirement.363  The legislature would do well to address both points 
in reformulating the law. 
D. Recommendations 
The legislature must eliminate the discriminatory treatment of transsexuals, 
which the court recognized in the present case.364  This change would meet the 
minimum guidelines set out by the court and also promote equality.  This 
remedy is most easily achieved by simply removing the clause requiring 
transsexuals be unmarried to have their new gender recognized, thus allowing 
the same-sex marriage to continue;365 but legislators should also consider 
future ramifications of the law affecting homosexuals and civil partnerships in 
Germany.  Discrimination remains in that area of the law, as described 
above,366 and the simple removal of the “unmarried” requirement from the 
Transsexual Law will allow those provisions to continue denying basic rights 
to large portions of the population.367  The State argues that this requirement is 
justified by a “positive duty to protect” marriage as between a man and a 
woman.368  Obvious discrimination against same-sex couples is not justified in 
light of recent German and European cultural, legal, and medical 
developments, however.369 
Legislators have also argued using the idea of medical necessity regarding 
their positions on transsexuality.370  It is unclear whether the law can provide 
positive protection to the physiological condition experienced by transsexuals 
without extending those rights to the equally scientifically verifiable condition 
 
 361. Id. at 37. 
 362. Id. 
 363. Grünberger, supra note 297, at 104. 
 364. BVerfGE, decision of May 27, 2008, docket number 1 BvL 10/05, § 49, available at 
juris online/Rechtsprechung. 
 365. Grünberger, supra note 297, at 105. 
 366. See supra, notes 305–63 and accompanying text. 
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to continue.  See Windel, supra note 104, at 69. 
 368. BVerfGE, decision of May 27, 2008, docket number 1 BvL 10/05, § 50, at juris 
online/Rechtsprechung: Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 
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experienced by homosexuals.371  That issue is particularly problematic in light 
of the possibility of marrying under current provisions that homosexual 
transsexuals and transsexuals opting for the “Minor Solution” have372—
contrary to the legislative intent of avoiding the appearance373 of same-sex 
marriage.374  Same-sex marriage stemming from transsexual rights may be the 
next legal challenge faced on marriage rights in Germany.  In the present case, 
the court does not require sweeping changes.  Guaranteed constitutional rights 
and fundamental fairness, on the other hand, would require them. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The court rightfully struck down the Transsexual Law because it required a 
choice between two fundamental personal rights guaranteed by the German 
constitution.  The Basic Law clearly states that the rights of individual integrity 
and marriage affected by the Transsexual Law are fundamental and therefore 
non-derogable.375  Consequently, the court has no choice but to demand 
reformulation of the law.  The only question is whether the legislature will 
pursue a bold plan or make the smallest possible changes to comply with the 
law.  The court here and EU human rights decisions from recent years suggest 
that the time has come for a significant expansion of the rights afforded to 
transsexuals and same-sex couples.  The federal government could make these 
changes with ease as it redraws the Transsexual Law, providing for true 
equality in Germany.  The larger changes would reach into more areas of the 
law, including tax and inheritance matters, but such refinements of the law 
would yield long-term benefits and they are fundamentally fair on 
constitutional grounds. 
The present case handles a relatively narrow class of individuals, but the 
effects of the new legislation may have much greater ramifications than readily 
apparent.  Following the precedent set in this case, at least one additional 
marriage will fall under the Transsexual Law in whatever form new legislation 
assumes: a pastor in the evangelical church in Westfalen has stepped down to 
 
 371. See, e.g., Ivanka Savic & Per Lindström, PET and MRI Show Differences in Cerebral 
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live as a woman.376  His wife claims she will be staying with him.377  Beyond 
such overlapping cases, however, the legislation could also affect same-sex 
couples living in life partnerships and potentially even unmarried couples.  The 
ramifications are both personal and public, emotional and financial.  In light of 
the major stakes in this case, the legislators would do well to look carefully at 
the direct and the indirect effects of their choices.  The legal and cultural trends 
described in this note suggest expanding rights on a broad basis.  Hopefully 
legislators will recognize these developments and act accordingly. 
GREGORY A. KNOTT 
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